‘Lovely People but Utterly Deluded’? British Political Science’s Trouble with Corbynism by Maiguashca, BE & Dean, J
 1 
‘Lovely People but Utterly Deluded’? British Political Science’s Trouble 
with Corbynism 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper argues that political scientists in Britain have, for the most part, failed 
to adequately understand Corbynism (i.e. the movement surrounding Labour 
Party leader Jeremy Corbyn) as a distinctive iteration of left politics. To 
substantiate this claim, we begin by mapping a consensus in British politics 
scholarship about the central features of Corbynism, namely that it is a 
misguided politics characterised by poor leadership, a “hard left” ideological 
orientation, and a populist flavour. In the second part of the paper, we suggest 
that this unfavourable characterisation of Corbynism relies on problematic 
analytic assumptions about leadership, the left, and populism. Furthermore, we 
argue that such narratives do not withstand empirical scrutiny, largely because 
they fail to do justice to the heterogeneous strands that constitute the politics of 
Corbynism. In the final part of the paper, we offer an explanation for political 
scientists’ trouble with Corbyn, highlighting the continued dominance of the 
Westminster Model, widespread confusion surrounding the 
descriptive/normative relation, and considerable convergence between 
academic and media depictions of Corbynism. Overall, we suggest that political 
scientists’ failure to take seriously the full complexity of the Corbyn movement 
requires  rectification.  
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‘If Corbyn is the answer, then the Labour Party is asking the wrong question’ 
(Observer editorial, 19/07/15) 
 
“you can do analysis of Corbyn and his “movement” (I have done it) but the 
essence of the whole thing is that they are just thick as pigshit” (Janan Ganesh, 
quoted in Allen 2018, p. 126). 
 
‘Jeremy Corbyn has to go. He is demonstrably unfit to be leader of the 
Opposition or to be Prime Minister. He lacks the personal skills needed, the 
temperament, or the ability to balance an argument between competing 
perspectives. He is also holding Labour back from being a credible party of 
government. Indeed, it is unclear if Labour is even a credible party of 
opposition’ (Crines, 2017, no pagination) 
 
 
It has become almost cliché to note that the rise of Jeremy Corbyn in British politics 
caught academics and commentators off guard. Not only did British politics 
academics fail to anticipate the rise of Corbynism, their dominant response, as Ben 
Worthy points out, ‘have been somewhere between unimpressed to hostile towards 
Corbyn’ (Worthy 2017, no pagination). But why were we so blindsided by his 
ascendancy and how can we explain the growing distance between widespread 
predictions of doom regarding his leadership and the revitalised left politics that keeps 
him in place? In other words, why does British political studies still seem to have a 
Corbyn problem?   
 
We develop an answer to this question across three parts of the article. In the first, we 
identify several recurrent tropes which, taken together, constitute the dominant 
consensus about this new politics in academic and media circles. More concretely, we 
suggest that the narrative that has come to prevail asserts that Corbyn is an ineffective 
and/or incompetent party leader and that his ineptitude casts doubt on the Labour 
Party’s viability as a party of government; that his election to the helm of the Party 
marks a move towards an ‘extreme’ or ‘hard left’ form of politics and, finally, that 
Corbyn’s politics is symptomatic of a more general unwelcome trend, namely the rise 
of populism.  
 
In the second part of the article, we offer a counter-narrative to what we suggest is a 
fundamental misdiagnosis and misrepresentation of ‘Corbynism’, understood here as 
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a social democratic project and a nascent, albeit still inchoate, hybrid movement 
which includes, but cannot be reduced to, Corbyn, as the leader of the Party nor to his 
team of advisers. In so doing, we seek to explore and contextualise – rather than offer 
final judgements about – the set of ideas and practices that have accompanied his 
ascendancy in the Labour Party and reflect on what they might tell us about the state 
and fortunes of the left in Britain. We start our riposte by turning to the question of 
leadership, unpacking the assumptions that sustain the idea that he is not fit for office, 
before suggesting that his impact may be better understood in terms of what he 
signifies at this particular political conjuncture: who he is and what he does matters 
less than what he represents, especially in light of how he compares to other 
politicians on either end of the ideological spectrum. We then go on to challenge the 
idea that Corbynism can, in any meaningful way, be characterised as ‘hard’ left. And 
finally, we argue for considerably more care and attention to the category of 
“populism”, and suggest that the tendency to cast Corbynism as populist says more 
about the over-use of “populism” in contemporary scholarly discourse than it does 
about Corbynism.  
 
In the final part, we offer a tentative explanation for the striking lack of sustained 
intellectual curiosity on the part of British politics academics toward this new left 
landscape, highlighting three key difficulties: first, a myopic conceptualisation of ‘the 
political’ and ‘politics’, second, a lack of methodological reflexivity combined with a 
tendency to allow normative/political judgements to trump careful, thick description 
and balanced analysis and, third, the role of the media and the symbiotic relationship 
that academics are developing with it. In other words, the neglect and 
misrepresentation of Corbynism must be situated within a wider academic and 
political climate and can only be rectified when this climate is recognised and 
contested. 
 
Before proceeding, two points of methodological clarification are needed. First, our 
argument draws on over three years of Leverhulme funded research dedicated to 
chasing down various manifestations of Corbynism from small, intimate academic 
workshops held in the back offices of think tanks to packed Church hall rallies. We 
also conducted semi-structured interviews with a total of 101 left activists, the vast 
majority Labour members and Corbyn supporters, as well as participant observation 
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at two Labour Party conferences (2016 and 2017) and the World Transformed Events 
that ran alongside them. It is important to note, however, that the argument we present 
here is not intended to be a summary of our empirical findings.1 Rather, our aim is to 
offer a critical analysis of the dominant narratives circulating in British academic 
circles about the Corbyn project and of the main analytical categories upon which 
they rest. For this reason, the empirical examples offered in this article are primarily 
illustrative in function and are geared toward justifying our claim that these narratives 
are simplistic, at best, and biased and/or ahistorical, at worst and, as such, do a 
disservice to scholarship on British politics in general and to a relatively new political 
phenomenon that deserves more thoughtful, even if critical, attention than it has 
garnered so far. 
 
Second, a word on the scope of the sources analysed. Our critical analysis of the 
narratives being deployed by British political scientists to make sense of Corbynism 
draws on two main sources: peer-reviewed articles in academic journals, and 
blogposts (on sites such as The Conversation, the LSE Policy and Politics blog, and 
PSA Political Insight). Although blogs constitute a rather different genre of writing 
that often seeks to address a potentially wider target audience, we have decided to 
include them as a relevant site of ‘knowledge’ production to the extent that they play 
a key role in shaping the broadly anti-Corbyn consensus within UK political science. 
Indeed, given the increasing importance of the impact agenda and the pressures being 
placed on scholars to disseminate their findings as widely as possible, these blogs can 
be seen as a continuation of academic commentary in a more popular format.2 In 
addition to blogposts it should also be noted that the anti-Corbyn thrust of the UK 
political science community is also expressed and sustained on social media: indeed, 
the informality of twitter debate is that political scientists’ normative opposition to the 
Corbynite left is even more overt and explicit than in more formal channels of 
publication.3 However, a more systematic analysis of socially mediated narratives 
about Corbynism lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
 
I. (Mis)diagnosing and (Mis)representing Corbynism  
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This section aims to trace three dominant framings of Corbyn and Corbynism 
reproduced in published articles and comment pieces written by fellow members of 
the UK political science community. Crucially, while there are of course differences 
in how individual political scientists explain and understand this left politics, we have 
found a striking consensus around Corbyn’s lack of leadership qualities, extremism 
and populism. What is more, this broadly unfavourable reportage of Corbyn is shared 
and reproduced by much of the media.  
 
 
Leadership and Electability 
 
‘Despite the early optimism of his supporters, Corbyn already looks like being 
one of the most ineffective and unpopular opposition leaders in the post-war 
era’ (Quinn, 2017, no pagination) 
 
Dire appraisals of his leadership capacities have defined much of the academic 
commentary on Corbyn with scholars such as John Curtice, Steven Fielding and 
Quinn, quoted at the start, all lamenting his personal ineptitude and what they foresee 
as Labour’s inevitable electoral annihilation (Curtice 2015, p.146; Fielding 2017a). 
More specifically, all seem to agree that Corbyn fails miserably on three widely-cited 
criteria for good leadership: acceptability, electability and competence (Stark 1996; 
Quinn 2016; Crines et al 2018). In terms of the first - i.e. the imperative that a 
prospective leader must be accepted by the party at large and be capable of fostering 
party unity – the evidence seems to speak for itself. After all, the Labour Party passed 
a no confidence motion against him in 2016, Owen Smith forced him into a second 
leadership bid and it remains true that a small, but significant percentage of the 
grassroots membership as well as high percentage of the Parliamentary Labour Party 
are set firmly against him.  
 
On electability, the verdict has been equally damning, at least until recently, with 
Jeffery and Bale (2017, no pagination) predicting a ‘post-catastrophe Commons’ prior 
to the 2017 election, one in which Labour would be decimated. While the main reason 
put forward for this anticipated doomsday scenario concerns his poor leadership 
skills, it also feeds off several other assumptions. One such is that pro-Corbyn 
activists are merely ‘clicktivists’ who eschew active campaigning, a point reinforced 
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by the ESRC Party Members Project which states that, ‘new members [i.e. those who 
joined around the time of the “Corbyn surge”] are plainly not as keen to get stuck in’ 
(Poletti et al 2016, no pagination). Another concerns the assumption that electoral 
victory in Britain can only be achieved from the political centre ground and that 
Corbyn’s enthusiastic commitment to left-wing politics will be his undoing 
(Hindmoor 2018, p. 47). Indeed, not understanding or accepting this political truism is 
part of what makes supporters of Corbyn, while “lovely people”, so irritatingly and 
“utterly deluded” (Bale 2016, p. 1). 
 
In addition to not being acceptable or electable, for most British political scientists 
Corbyn is also patently not competent. The supporting evidence put forward for this 
judgment includes criticisms of his general demeanour and persona, his equivocation 
on Brexit, his handling of the Anti-Semitism crisis that has dogged the party, his 
perceived interest in “protest” rather than “policy” and his controversial foreign 
policy stances on issues like Palestinian rights and Trident. What is notable about 
these attacks on his proficiency is how personal they have become as the musing of 
one journalist illustrates when describing him as: ‘A rather dreary bearded fellow who 
…doesn’t drink alcohol or eat meat and wears shorts teamed with long dark socks 
exposing an expanse of pale, hairy English shin’ (Pearson, 2015, no pagination).  
 
 
“Hard Left” 
 
While few would dispute that Corbyn and allies such as John McDonnell are in many 
senses more “left-wing” than their predecessors, it is notable how quickly their brand 
of leftness was roundly judged by academic and media commentators alike as “hard”, 
uncompromising and irresponsibly “radical”. So, for example, while Ben Jackson 
describes Corbyn’s support as underpinned by ‘those on the hard left’ (Jackson 2016, 
p.3) and Hindmoor characterises his politics as “far left” (2018, p. 68), others like 
Thomas Quinn prefer the language of “radical-leftist” (Quinn 2016, p. 761). Using 
rather colourful military metaphors, Andrew Crines adds his voice to the consensus 
claiming that Labour is currently ‘occupied by the hard left and its Generals are 
sitting in key positions’ (Crines, 2016, no pagination). Talk of “Corbynite ultras” 
(Steven Fielding 2017b), “Corbynistas” and Momentum “militants” (Pabst 2017, p. 
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504), all of whom are deemed to be ‘ideologically pure but politically impotent’ 
(Dorey and Denham 2016, p.261), contribute to painting a picture of Corbynism as 
the resuscitation of a “looney left”. This view has to a large extent been reinforced by 
much media coverage, for instance through the deployment of familiar signifiers of 
Cold War-era communism, such as the beret or the hammer and sickle.  
 
This apparent “hardening” of Labour’s leftism is sometimes blamed on what has been 
called “entryism”, i.e. members of the extra-parliamentary Marxist left cynically 
joining the Labour Party with the purpose of steering it in a more radical direction. 
Although rarely explicit, “hard left entryists” are cast as infiltrators, “outsiders 
within”, for whom electability is a secondary concern, given that they think that 
parliamentary politics is ‘a bourgeois preoccupation which invariably result[s] in the 
ideological betrayal of the working class’ (Dorey 2017, p.12). With Stalinists and 
Trotskyites supposedly filling the ranks of the once Labour Party, it has become seen 
as self-evident that Corbynism is aligned with the “far”, “hard”, and “radical” left.   
 
 
Populism 
 
While authors vary in terms of how they characterise the alleged populism of the 
Corbyn project, there seems to be a growing consensus that Corbynism reflects a 
broader “populist turn”, a view that has gained traction since the 2017 election proved 
that Corbyn is more electable than British scholars had initially anticipated. Matt 
Flinders, for example, contends that ‘the ‘Corbyn effect’ was essentially synonymous 
with the adoption of a populist strategy that sought to re-frame the Labour Party as a 
fresh, new, anti-political, anti-establishment ‘outsider’ party’ (Flinders 2018, p.222), 
while Peter Dorey (2017, pp.309-310) casts Corbynism as ‘a variant of Left-wing 
populism’. Others, on the other hand, have sought to flag up what they see as the 
similarities between Corbynism and its right-wing counterparts. Particularly assertive 
in this regard is a recent essay on ‘postliberalism’ by Adrian Pabst, which suggests 
that UKIP and Corbyn ‘share a certain anti-liberal outlook’ in which, among other 
things, both ‘promote a plebiscite populism that locks politics into a dialectical 
movement between empty mass theatrics and the power of oligarchy old or new’ 
(Pabst 2017, p.504). A more nuanced take is offered in a recent article by Peter Kerr 
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et al on discourses of “modernisation” in British politics, which notes that ‘Corbyn, 
Farage, May, the Brexiteers and so on…. mobilise and recruit voters around populist 
appeals which identify past practices and values that need to be restored as a 
corrective to modernising trends’ (Kerr et al 2018, p.302).  
 
Whatever the nature of the comparisons, what is unmistakeable, at least in the UK 
context, is that equating Corbynism with populism is to frame it as potentially 
threatening to British democracy as such.4 As Matt Flinders summarises the problem, 
Corbynism understood as a ‘left-wing strain of populism’ must be seen as ‘a 
dangerous political virus’ (Flinders 2018 p. 233) aimed at only obtaining and 
retaining power (p. 255).  
 
In sum, there is considerable convergence within the UK political science community 
around the view that Corbyn is a bad leader who stems from and attracts the 
“militant” left which today is increasingly adopting “populist” strategies. Taken 
together, these three “truths” serve to justify the derision and alarm expressed by 
British political scientists, a position that has been sustained by mainstream media 
outlets across the ideological spectrum (Cammaerts et al 2016). 
 
 
2. Demythologising Corbynism: a critique and a recasting 
 
These academic representations of Corbynism are, we argue, highly problematic both 
empirically and analytically. Empirically, most of the claims made are at best rather 
partial – focusing disproportionately on one specific feature of Corbyn’s politics – 
and at worst simply inaccurate, grounded in clichéd mischaracterisation rather than 
careful scholarly analysis. Above all, the depictions rest on the use of analytic 
categories e.g., “leadership” or “hard left” that are not adequately conceptualised or 
explained, let alone justified.  Let’s take each narrative in turn.  
 
 
On Leadership and Electability 
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Unpersuaded by the current wisdom prevailing among British academics that Corbyn 
is simply a “bad” leader, we would like to proffer two counter-narratives. The first is 
that even in light of Stark’s criteria, Corbyn’s leadership skills are perhaps less poor 
than initially portrayed. The second is that applying this criteria with no reference to 
the conception of leadership that animates Corbyn, his team or his supporters provides 
a very narrow, self-referential evaluation of this project.  
 
Starting with Stark’s first criteria, i.e., acceptability, while, undoubtedly, the bulk of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party is uncomfortable with Corbyn, he nonetheless 
continues to draw broad support from the Labour Party membership, despite the 
recent crisis over Brexit. In this regard, it perhaps bears repeating that he won the 
initial leadership race with 59.5% of first preference votes, compared to 19% for the 
next contender, Andy Burnham. This vote of confidence only increased a year later to 
61.1% when he beat Owen Smith in the 2016 race. Moreover, it is also worth noting 
that in 2015 Corbyn received support from 44% of those who joined the Labour Party 
before 2010 and 49% from those who joined under Ed Miliband (Younge 2018). This 
seems to suggest that rather than constituting the spontaneous eruption of a 
‘personality cult’ within Labour, the results of the leadership races reflected a deeper 
ideological shift in the direction of the party, one that pre-dated Corbyn.  Last but not 
least, Corbyn’s scoring on the acceptability criterion clearly depends entirely on who 
needs to “accept” him – the Party, as a whole, or the PLP? If it is the former, he has 
achieved the biggest mandate ever granted to a Labour leader. If it is the latter, he 
remains unacceptable.   
 
In terms of electability, Labour’s performance at the 2017 General Election to a large 
extent falsified the forecasts of British Political Scientists, resulting in an outpouring 
of apology and self-deprecating mea culpas (see, for example, Bale, 2017; Worthy, 
2017). With Labour winning 40% of the vote, the Party under Corbyn’s leadership 
managed to strengthen its mandate by 9.6 %, the largest such increase since 1945 
(Dorey 2017, p. 319). Thus, not only did Corbyn contribute to reversing the long term 
decline in Labour’s vote share (which had begun under Blair), he was also able to 
wage an election campaign that, as Dorey concedes, played a pivotal role in the 
election results given that many Labour supporters resolved to vote for Labour during 
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the campaign itself. In this context, claims that Corbyn is a liability to the Labour 
Party’s electoral fortunes now seem unfounded (Dorey 2017, p. 317) 
 
Moreover, the dramatically improved membership figures of the Labour Party, largely 
under the auspices of Corbyn, from 166,000 in 2008 (van Biezen et al 2012, p. 252) 
to 554,000 today (Audickas et al 2017), may also help explain its unexpectedly good 
election results. While membership size does not necessarily correlate with electoral 
performance, Bale et al conclude their survey of British political party members by 
noting that ‘it’s impossible to prove, but the results of the 2017 general election – and 
in particular the performance of the Labour Party – suggest that having more 
members can make a difference’ (Bale et al 2018b, p.39). If this is in fact the case and 
Bale et al. are correct, then one can only assume that Corbyn’s “acceptability” at least 
to his Party membership, if not his PLP, has most likely enhanced his “electability”.   
 
Finally, we suggest that assessing the “competence” of a leader, Stark’s third 
criterion, depends on which leadership activities one prioritizes as well as the 
standards by which they are assessed. For whatever missteps Corbyn may have made 
and continues to make as an individual leader, it remains indisputable that over the 
past three years he has enabled and even inspired his team and supporters, in and 
outside of the Labour Party, to start developing the intellectual backbone of a new left 
politics, one now defined by a plethora of position papers and new policies (Eaton 
2018). This process of intellectual renewal has centred particularly around discussions 
of new forms of ownership, “post-work”, universal basic income, and automation 
(Williams and Srnicek, 2015; Bastani, 2019). And while relatively few of these ideas 
found their way into the 2017 Manifesto – and have been scathingly dubbed “cyborg 
socialism” by some within the party (Cruddas, 2018) – they nonetheless suggest that 
there is a process, albeit contested, of intellectual revitalisation within the Corbynite 
left.5 
 
This new found intellectual confidence is particularly striking given that, as Tim 
Bale’s own careful work on Ed Miliband’s tenure makes clear, it follows a period of 
deep paralysis in which the Labour Party found itself unable to respond to any of the 
key issues of the day, i.e, the financial crash, the perceived immigration crisis and 
alleged profligate welfare spending of government (Bale 2015). Thus, a verdict of 
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“incompetence” requires some reflection on the content of the politics on offer as well 
as on the ways in which it speaks to (or not) the interests and needs of the British 
public. 
 
Moving away from the Stark criteria, we suggest that an alternative way of 
adjudicating the vitality and legitimacy of a leader is to take seriously the wishes and 
demands of those being led, i.e., to pursue a more immanent critique. From this 
vantage point, Corbynism must be seen, among other things, as a form of collective 
activism oriented to empowering communities from the ground up. To this extent, 
leadership is less about the capacities of an individual to guide the Party from here to 
there and more about his or her ability to open up space for others to think and act 
creatively. Corbyn captures this conception of leadership when he explains: ‘The fact 
is, it’s not about me: it’s about us, it’s about a movement, it’s about people, it’s about 
ideas, it’s about people looking for some collective way forward’ (quoted in 
Unterrainer 2016, p. 14). Corbynism, then, can be seen as an open-ended project to 
which a range of actors are expected to contribute and which demands a model of 
leadership that is process oriented, dialogical and participatory (Wainwright 2018). 
Indeed, it is our intuition that it is precisely because he has eschewed the traditional 
ideological and aesthetic trappings of a media savvy leader that Corbyn has been 
more successful than many anticipated. 
 
In sum, not only does Corbyn perform rather better on traditional indices of party 
leadership than some allow for, his election as party leader and subsequent 
performance points towards a different normative model of leadership, one that 
cannot be made sense of in the literature as it stands. Indeed, this raises questions 
about the utility and objectivity of this kind of fixed criteria, especially when they are 
so clearly disconnected from the aspirations and benchmarks of success upheld by 
those being judged wanting. In other words, a more fruitful appraisal of Corbyn’s 
leadership would interrogate the claim that Corbyn is a bad leader tout court and 
rather pursue and defend the argument that the conception of leadership that he and 
his supporters seem to be committed to is wrong headed or dangerous or both. But 
this would require sustained empirical analysis and a degree of conceptual reflection, 
an exercise that so far only a few British journalists are beginning – post-Labour Party 
Conference 2018 – to undertake. 
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On Leftism 
 
As already indicated, a taken for granted truth among British academics is that what 
we are witnessing in Corbynism is the resurrection of an “extreme” or “hard” left 
politics, a hangover from the factional disputes last seen in the 1980s (Hannah, 2017). 
Here we want to draw attention to two conceptual difficulties that soon become 
apparent when one scratches the surface of this claim. The first pertains to the 
common habit of political scientists to define the left in terms of a fixed set of policy 
attitudes, thereby evacuating from view its historical lineage as well as its broader 
political and normative content. A second conception of the “hard left” that does a lot 
of the heavy lifting when it comes to prevailing caricatures of Corbynism is more 
implicit in the literature and bundles together various stereotypes from 
authoritarianism to proletarianism. Either way, neither of these framings have been 
subjected to critical scrutiny. 
 
With respect to the first conceptual misrepresentation, characterisations of Corbynism 
as “hard left” usually rest on two measures which emerge from quantitative political 
science and which both involve the use of scales. In the first case this scale is based 
on an individual’s self-placement on a 0-10 left/right scale (see, for example, Bale et 
al 2016; Quinn 2016). A second, supposedly more ‘objective’ measure, involves 
matching peoples’ attitudes to certain policy measures (such as taxation, NHS 
spending etc.) and then plotting them on a scale from left to right (Bale et al 2016). 
Even on its own terms, however, this second way of calibrating left politics throws up 
some very counter intuitive results such as the recent finding by Bale et al that UKIP 
members are apparently more left-wing than members of the Liberal Democrats 
(2016).  
 
Leaving such surprises aside, we want to raise questions about the meaningfulness of 
reducing the “left” to as a set of fixed policy positions, especially in light of the rich 
tradition of political thought that has worked hard to define and conceptualise the 
specificity of left politics. Conceptualising the left as an evolving political project 
with roots that go back over two hundred years, thinkers, such as Noberto Bobbio 
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(1996) and Steven Lukes (2003), offer us a very different picture of what constitutes 
“the left”, one that sees it as a collectively enacted set of practices, which are 
animated by an ethos of equality and a commitment to the rectification of injustice. 
Capturing the specificity of Corbynism through this lens would require the researcher 
to explore its distinct ideological, affective, aesthetic and epistemic features as well as 
the collective practices they have inspired (see authors 2018) and then to historically 
contextualise them within the broader history of British left politics. From this angle, 
it becomes much easier to see that Corbyn’s putative extremism comes into sharp 
relief only when compared to the left political project immediately preceding it, i.e., 
New Labour, as well as to the hegemonic neoliberal consensus of the day (Hall 2011). 
Widen the historical lens, however, and descriptions of “hard left” start to falter not 
only in straight forward policy terms6, but also with respect to its mode of doing of 
politics, a point we will come back to. As Lorna Finlayson states, ‘Corbyn’s left 
reformism is mild by the standards of earlier generations, by the standards of some 
other European countries and even in comparison to public opinion in the UK’ (2018, 
p. 18). Indeed, and somewhat ironically, a number of media commentators are now 
suggesting that the trouble with Corbynism is that it is not radical enough (Harris 
2018; Eaton 2018). 
 
But there is a second conception of “the hard left” that operates outside the narrow 
political science matrix and which, in our view, has taken hold among many 
commentators in both academic and media. This tacit conception of the left generally 
evokes three features. The first is vanguardism which is associated with the belief that 
‘if the correct leadership captured the machine they could organise and evangelise 
their way to power’ (Thompson 2016, p. 46), a strategy best secured by allowing an 
influx of entryists and by a dogmatic and authoritarian approach to all and any 
challenges. A second related feature concerns the prevalence of hierarchical modes of 
organisation in which decisions are made in a top down way and where there is little 
scope for meaningful grassroots involvement. The third but perhaps most commonly 
associated attribute of a “hard left” politics is a Marxist-inflected emphasis on class as 
the central axis of oppression and on the working class as the key agent of 
emancipatory change. 
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So, is the politics of Corbynism “hard left” in this alternative sense? First of all, 
despite Hindmoor’s complaint that Corbynism rejects any ‘give and take’ because 
compromise is seen as both ‘immoral and ineffective’ (2018, p. 17), we have found no 
evidence that the model of leadership or the mode of organising in the Labour Party 
can be accurately described as either vanguardist or top down. On the contrary, 
having little support within the PLP, Corbyn and his political colleagues appear to be 
sustained primarily by an uneasy alliance between trade unionists, party members and 
grassroots activists, a motley mix of diverse political traditions that at times rub 
against each other. As was evident at the 2018 Labour Conference, it is the at times 
bitter struggles between these groups (over e.g. Brexit, Trident, the best way to 
democratise the Labour Party) and the evolving, uncomfortable compromises being 
forged therein that will shape the direction of the Labour Party. Thus, while there may 
be some unity of purpose and vision, there is still little agreement as to the means to 
achieve them. Moreover, Corbyn himself largely eschews the epistemic certitude 
characteristic of more overtly vanguardist forms of Marxism/Leninism, displaying a 
degree of ‘laissez faire’ leadership, pace Hindmoor, that belies any claims that he has 
an authoritarian hold over his Party. Indeed, of late he has been critiqued for his 
constructive ambiguity over a range of issues including Brexit and chastised for not 
giving the Party a clear direction. Last but not least, with far fewer entryists 
infiltrating the Party than predicted – there simply are not enough active Trotskyists in 
the UK (Fielding, 2018; Kelly, 2018) – vanguardism is not a viable option.  
 
There is equally little evidence to suggest that Corbynism, as a left project, revolves 
exclusively or even mainly around class either as the main site of oppression or as the 
principal agent of change (Seymour 2016). Corbyn’s own discourse makes only 
sporadic reference to class and amongst our interviewees invocations of class were 
surprisingly infrequent with more attention being paid to exclusions around gender, 
race and sexuality. This is not to say that there are no efforts among pro-Corbyn 
supporters to draw more attention to the politics of class in Britain (clearly there are) 
but simply that it remains a site of contestation and struggle in which class politics is 
simply one strand among others.  
 
What is very interesting to us as scholars, however, and what potentially distinguishes 
Corbynism from previous renditions of left politics in Britain is the small, but 
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growing space that has been created – consciously and unconsciously - for the politics 
of race (or rather anti-racism) and feminism. While we do not have space to elaborate 
on this claim (see authors 2018 for a more detailed account), we want to draw 
attention to the fact that racial politics, as a site of oppression as well as of 
autonomous organising, found little support, until recently, from either the “right” or 
the “hard left” of the Labour Party (Hannah 2018, p. 47). And while rarely mentioned 
in media or academic coverage of Corbynism, we found that our interviewees 
involved in anti-racist politics were almost unanimous in their cautious optimism 
towards Corbynism’s amenability to various forms of anti-racist politics.7 Similarly, 
with regards to feminism, it is possible to note some significant inroads made by 
socialist, intersectional and anti-racist feminists, at grassroots level, and represented in 
the shadow cabinet by the likes of Cat Smith, Dawn Butler and Kate Osamoor. Thus, 
periodic characterisations of the Corbyn movement as hostile to women and/or 
feminism (see, for example, Newman 2015) tend to presuppose a variant of white 
liberal feminism as the benchmark against which Corbynism is judged. Ironically, 
these recent attempts by Corbyn-supporters to enact a more sustained engagement 
with questions of gender and race have come under attack from all wings of the party 
for supposedly nurturing a divisive form of “identity politics” (see Simons, 2016). 
 
 
On Corbynism as Populism  
 
As already stated, Corbynism is frequently labelled “populist” by academics and 
journalists alike.  Whether there is any truth to this assertion depends, of course, on 
what is meant by the term. Although still contested, it can be argued that a consensus 
appears to be emerging – at least in the literature on European populism – around an 
ideational definition which sees populism as ‘a thin-centered ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the 
pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004, p.563).  
 
On this definition for a politics to stand any chance of being seen as genuinely 
populist, it must be antagonistic in orientation with “the people” acting as its core 
constituency and as the basis of its legitimacy. The problem is that we find minimal 
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evidence to uphold this characterization of Corbynism. Granted, Corbyn – like most 
politicians – does make occasional allusions to “the people”, and his supporters 
consider themselves “anti-establishment” in a very general sense, but this is true of 
most forms of oppositional politics whether from the right or the left. More 
importantly, the discourses of Corbyn and Momentum tend not to centralise “the 
people” as their main addressee, but rather revolve around substantive values such as 
“justice”, “fairness”, and “equality”. Just as importantly, it is simply not accurate to 
frame Corbynism as an antagonistic politics that pits the “real” people against a 
singular, identifiable enemy (see author 2017; Glaser 2017). We are not alone in our 
skepticism. Luke March’s analysis of left and right populism in the UK finds that 
‘populism’s ubiquity is much overstated’ (March 2017, p.283) in part because what 
passes for ‘populism’ ‘is not really populism at all but demoticism (closeness to 
ordinary people), a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for populism to 
thrive. We agree: Corbynism is certainly a “demotic” politics, but it is not populist. 
  
 
 
3. Making Sense of the Corbyn Problem 
 
‘interpreting and explaining events that confirm existing theories and beliefs is 
relatively straightforward. Interpreting and explaining the unexpected requires 
additional reserves of intellectual energy’ (Allen and Bartle 2018, p.xv). 
 
So far we have mapped some of the dominant narratives about Corbynism that one 
finds in British political science, and have sought to demonstrate that in addition to 
not withstanding empirical scrutiny, they make rather sloppy use of certain kinds of 
analytic categories. But this begs the question of how and why British political 
scientists have struggled to come to terms with Corbynism. Here we want to argue 
that far from being the result of careless scholarship on the part of individuals, these 
problems are in fact systemic within the discipline as a whole. The first of these relate 
to the continued hold of what is sometimes called the Westminster Model of politics 
and a second pertains to a general confusion around how to navigate one’s normative 
commitments when conducting political science enquiry. The role of the media, and 
political scientists’ relationship to it, is a third important factor. 
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The Westminster Model and its Discontents  
 
The Westminster Model, as Kerr and Kettell point out in their introduction to the first 
issue of British Politics, has historically tended to dominate the study of British 
politics. This model, they tell us, entails ‘a distinctly narrow view of ‘the political’ 
…, aligned with a largely static and fundamentally benign impression of Britain’s 
central political institutions and processes’ (Kerr and Kettell 2006, p.7, emphasis 
added). More concretely, they argue that the conception of politics underwriting this 
model is both reductive, to the extent it pertains almost exclusively to the institutions 
and activities of central government and its elite players, and ahistorical because these 
favoured actors and features are assumed to be durable and reliably predicable. Last 
but not least, this model takes for granted the generally accommodating and inclusive 
nature of British politics, with its exclusionary effects (such as those related to race, 
class and gender) either downplayed or overlooked. While Kerr and Kettell conclude 
by calling for a more dynamic, theoretically-informed and expansive conception of 
British politics, the current state of commentary on Corbynism suggests that their call 
remains unheeded.  
 
For as we have seen, the narratives reviewed here reflect a deep, uncritical attachment 
to the Westminster Model. Rather than explore the recent wave of left politics in 
Britain as a confluence of diverse social forces which have come together under 
particular conditions, British political science has reduced this highly complex and 
evolving phenomenon to the utterances and performance of one individual man, 
Corbyn, (Diamond 2016; Quinn 2016) and/or his relationship with his own PLP 
(Crines et al 2017). But this overlooks the fact that the specificity of Corbynism lies 
in, as Jeremy Gilbert (2017) puts it, the interplay between “Labourism” (i.e. the 
institutional machinations of the Labour Party) and “movementism” (i.e. looser, more 
grassroots networks of activists). Thus, if we want to understand why Corbynism has 
not only emerged but has some staying power, despite the odds stacked against it, we 
require a much deeper and expansive analytical toolkit than that provided by the 
Westminster Model.  
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Furthermore, irrespective of one’s normative commitments, we would suggest that the 
subfield of British politics is not well-served by the repeated denigration and 
infantilising of Corbyn-supporting activists, either as “populists” or as simply a bunch 
of “deluded” lefties: whether for good or bad, the modes of doing politics enacted by 
and for Corbynism cannot be wished away. The tendency to resort to denigration and 
dismissal reflects badly on the affective and normative orientations that underpin 
British political studies, and on our capacity to exercise requisite levels of intellectual 
curiosity and openness in the face of unexpected trends and developments.  
 
But if not the Westminster model, then what? While we do not have room to develop 
an alternative framework, we want to simply acknowledge two conceptual templates 
that might inspire some thoughts about how to expand our conception of the political. 
The first comes from Foster et al (2012), who argue that we must distinguish between 
arena and process based conceptions of politics, the former limited to a narrowly 
demarcated institutional arena, and the latter referring to the exercise and contestation 
of power irrespective of its spatial location. While the former has been historically 
dominant within the discipline of political science, a process-based conception of 
politics better enables the analyst to understand two things that are particularly 
pertinent to Corbynism, namely the temporal fluidity and unpredictability of political 
struggle (in contrast to the Westminster Model’s view of politics as largely static 
and/or stable), and the multiplicity of different actors in a range of different spatial 
locations who, collectively constitute Corbynism as a politics (this potentially 
includes, but is not limited to, Corbyn himself, the shadow cabinet, sympathetic MPs, 
ordinary Labour Party members, academics, journalists and commentators, and non-
aligned activists who come into the orbit of Corbynism).  
 
A second source of possible inspiration could come from Andreas Kalyvas who 
thinks of the political in terms of two forms of power. The first he calls constituted 
power, that is, a power ‘determined by the previous legal order’ or ‘deriving its 
legality from a pre-existing constitution’ (2005, p. 228). Such a view presumes a 
linear temporality and sees the institutional rules of the game as reflecting a degree of 
legitimacy that has been consolidated and tested over time. Politics in this picture is a 
self-contained game that reflects its democratic origins: any politics which seeks to 
bend or subvert these rules is either misguided or normatively undesirable. By 
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contrast, the second is constituent power, which stresses ‘the power to found, to posit, 
to constitute’ (2005, p. 225) and seeks to disrupt the prevailing order. This is a 
creative force that refuses the legitimacy of the status quo in the name of an 
unrecognised or excluded community. It is from this vantage point that one can see 
and explore the dynamic, bottom-up character of politics, its contingency and 
variability as well as the points of fracture within the established order of things.  
 
Acknowledging either of these latter two conceptions - Foster’s process based vision 
or Kalyvas’ constituent power – would help contextualise and complicate the 
Westminster model, widening our view of whose actions count as political and where 
they can take place. In this framing, Corbynism would be conceptualised as a form of 
constituent power, a moment of rupture and resistance that goes beyond the arenas of 
“politics as usual” and which seeks to found a new order. Understanding this moment 
of collective recalcitrance, along with its various modes of expression, and its fraught 
interactions with those forces sustaining the constituted order of the day becomes the 
essential task of political scientists and political theorists, for it is precisely at this 
juncture of struggle and antagonism that politics is made and remade.  
 
 
On Reflexivity and Politicised Scholarship 
 
‘Research is a process which occurs through the medium of a person – the 
researcher is always and inevitably present in the research. This exists whether 
openly stated or not…’ (Stanley and Wise 1993, p. 175). 
 
A second challenge that the discipline has to face when trying to make sense of 
Corbynism is methodological in nature and concerns the tension produced by the 
imperative of having to produce “objective” political science in a context where one’s 
overriding normative and affective/emotional commitments run against the particular 
case of politics under consideration. As we have seen, the barely concealed disdain 
and frustration that underpins many of the rebukes of Corbyn’s politics belie what 
appears to be a strong political reaction against the kind of left politics he allegedly 
represents as well as a normative investment in the established order of British 
democratic politics, consolidating what Richard Hayton calls ‘an unthinking 
acceptance of the British Political Tradition as our underlying organising perspective’ 
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(Hayton 2018, p.368). Peter Allen has gone further by suggesting that what we are 
witnessing is a form of ‘epistemic snobbery’ whereby British Political scientists have 
decided that Corbynism is unworthy of their intellectual attention and analytical 
efforts. As Allen puts it, ‘consistently asserting the pointlessness of the new [Labour] 
members’ and supporters’ endeavour displays a fundamental suspicion of [any] 
political discourse that is not synonymous in form or content with recognized ‘expert’ 
sources’ (Allen 2018, p.126). 
 
To be clear: this is not to argue for a rigid imposition of a fact/value distinction of the 
kind found in classical positivism, and neither is it to say that Corbyn critics should 
abandon their sincerely-held opposition to Corbyn(ism) or to the wider left. Rather, it 
is to call for more reflexivity and openness about the ways in which our normative 
commitments inform and shape our analyses. One way to do this is to heed feminist 
calls to situate one’s knowledge claims which demands, at a minimum, that we 
explicitly own up to our epistemic and political commitments. Or as Stanley and Wise 
put it, the ‘artful construction’ of sound, honest academic knowledge requires that 
‘researchers must ‘come out’ in their writings’ (1993, p. 175-76). Such an exercise 
pushes against glib generalisations by asking the researcher to set out the analytical 
and conceptual criteria that they are using to defend their claims.  
 
In light of this demand for full disclosure, we happily admit that we self-identify as 
‘feminist’ scholars on ‘the left’ and that our appraisal of Corbynism has been shaped 
by the commitments that come with this political allegiance. In this sense we are at 
least sympathetic to the aims of the Corbyn project, if not always the methods used by 
its supporters or their consequences. Indeed, our track record of scholarship 
demonstrates that neither of us are naive cheerleaders of left politics: between us we 
have published several pieces that underscore what we see as its limitations and 
challenges from a feminist perspective (authors, 2010, 2016, 2018). These critiques 
notwithstanding, we still maintain that there are good reasons to be inquisitive about 
and attentive to the potentially innovative, creative and progressive aspects of 
Corbynism.  
 
Furthermore, we would stress that there is no necessary relation between normative 
opposition to a certain politics, and a lack of intellectual curiosity about it. Consider, 
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for instance, the fact that the UK political science community has, at the time of 
writing, arguably expressed more interest in and even agonistic respect towards UKIP 
and the far right than it has towards Corbynism (see, for example, Ford and Goodwin, 
2014). Consider also the fact that a number of authors situated outside the confines of 
British political science have managed to produce good, detailed analyses of 
Corbynism which, while certainly critical, nonetheless offer thoughtful and nuanced 
reflections on this British left project. The work of political economists Harry Pitts 
and Matt Bolton (2018) provides such a case, offering as it does a careful 
consideration of the historical emergence of Corbynism, the different strands of left 
politics that constitute it, and the ideas and practices that sustain it. And while we 
disagree with a number of their conceptual and empirical claims – concerning, for 
instance, the “populist” character of Corbynism – the rigour of their analysis, 
alongside their plaintive call for Corbyn critics to take Corbynism seriously, stands in 
sharp contrast to the glib characterisations and crude dismissals analysed above.8 Our 
concern is, therefore, not with British political science’s normative opposition to 
Corbynism per se. It is, rather, with the fact that this normative opposition all too 
often spills over into un-reflexive and un-rigorous scholarship. This spilling over is 
neither inevitable nor desirable.  
 
The Role of the Media 
 
One final striking feature of academic analyses around Corbynism is the extent of 
their convergence with the overwhelmingly unfavourable responses to Corbyn across 
a range of media sites. While several commentators have itemised the erroneous 
claims made about Corbynism that have circulated in the media (Davies 2017; 
Worthy 2017), a report commissioned by the LSE concluded that Corbyn has been 
subjected to ‘a process of vilification’ that went ‘well beyond the normal limits of fair 
debate’ (Cammaerts et al 2016, p. 2) and that is unprecedented for a British political 
leader. Surveying the coverage, they point to the way in which both the right wing 
press and liberal left media such as The Guardian and The Daily Mirror went from 
‘watchdog’ to ‘attack dog’ and in doing so blurred the distinction between ‘comment, 
conjecture and fact’ (Cammaerts et al 2016, p. 4). Left-wing journalist Gary Younge 
(incidentally, a keynote speaker at the 2018 Political Studies’ Association conference) 
has also indicted journalists for dismissing and lampooning ‘one of the most 
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interesting periods of recent political history’, describing their coverage of Corbyn as 
one of ‘egregious professional malpractice’ (Younge 2017). He also rightly points to 
the parochialism of British media punditry - a point that could also be made about the 
academic commentary - to the extent that Corbynism is rarely, if ever, contextualised 
in relation to the resurgence of grassroots left politics across Europe and the US.  
 
Against this backdrop, two specific points are worth noting. The first is that, at least 
in relation to Corbynism, British academics have not sought to develop their own 
“voice” and set of analyses, preferring instead to corroborate, rather than question, the 
sensationalist and hyperbolic media narratives. Of course, this reciprocity serves both 
parties. As Peter Allen (2019) has pointed out, academic knowledge can, when 
disseminated into the public domain, afford epistemic status and value to particular 
media claims, in part because of the sheen of impartiality and objectivity that is 
assumed to accompany scholarly research. For our part, academics are increasingly 
being incentivised to cultivate closer links with those – journalists, politicians, policy 
makers - who might disseminate as well as implement our knowledge (Hayton 2018). 
This in turn has given rise to a second point which concerns what Peter Allen has 
called the “professionalization of political science”, a process which increasingly 
aligns academics with media and policy professionals at the expense of keeping in 
touch with politics as it is lived and experienced by ordinary citizens and political 
activists.  
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The overall aim of this article has been to highlight the broad consensus within the 
British political science community as to the nature and character of Corbynism and 
to demonstrate that this shared narrative is problematic for both empirical and 
conceptual reasons. With respect to the latter point, we have suggested that the 
Westminster Model tends to naturalise the machinations of elite politicians as the 
proper object of British politics scholarship and, thereby, inadvertently privileges its 
constituted rather than constitutive mode. In so doing, a broad swathe of potentially 
relevant and interesting features come to fall outside the analytical scope of the 
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political scientist – in this case, the broad ideological context in which Corbynism 
gained traction in the first place, the various parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
social forces that have converged to sustain it, as well as the aspirations, narratives 
and experiences of the individual activists and citizens that call for it.  
 
A further complication when trying to make sense of Corbynism concerns the 
unrecognised impact that our ideological commitments have on our scholarship. In 
this article, we have been open about our own position as feminists on the left who, 
although surprised by Corbyn’s victory and doubtful about some aspects of this new 
politics, still think it deserves at least as much scholarly attention as the right is 
currently commanding from British scholars. Our point here is not that others should 
join us in our qualified support for this project: we are after all committed to a 
feminist left politics that others may not share! Rather we want to insist on the 
importance of grounding our proclamations and predictions, if we feel we must, on a 
much higher degree of conceptual reflexivity and more careful, nuanced empirical 
investigations. In other words, while we do not expect British political scientists to be 
more positive about Corbyn, we do think they need to be more curious about and 
rigorous in their engagement with the politics that surrounds him so that when they do 
decide to label him a “populist” or describe his supporters as “utterly deluded” they at 
least have some evidence based reasons to do so.  
Endnotes 
 
1 For a much fuller account of some aspects of our empirical research on left politics in Britain and its 
relationship to feminism see authors 2018. 
2 For an interesting take on the gendered fallout of the Impact agenda’s requirement for academics to 
engage with the media, in general and with social media, in particular see Savigny. 2019. 
3 Indeed, the anti-Corbyn thrust of much of pol sci twitter is so familiar that there is even a well loved 
parody account - @ProfBritPol – which satirises political scientists’ tendency to combine visceral 
normative opposition to Corbyn with an ostensible commitment to “objective” data-driven political 
science. In one case, for instance, @ProfBritPol announced the publication of an “analytical essay” 
entitled “The Nightmare Rise of Jeremy Corbyn”. For the record, the authors of this paper would like 
to dispel any rumors that one or other of us is behind the @ProfBritPol twitter account. 
4 Unlike in the UK, in Southern Europe there is a tradition of using “populism” to describe a particular 
form of politics favourably, particularly by analysts of left parties (Stavrakakis and Katsembekis 2014) 
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5 Although disapproving from a policy standpoint, the Economist has recently and grudgingly 
acknowledged that it is the British Labour Party, of all mainstream left parties, that is offering the 
‘most radical, detailed plans for the democratisation of the economy’ (Economist Feb 16th 2019).  
6 Arguably both the Labour Party of 1983 and the breakaway centrist Social Democratic Party 
defended more radical or “hard left” economic platforms than the current Labour Party under Corbyn 
(Hannah 2017, p.235; see also Goes 2018; Jackson 2017). 
7 This is, of course, complicated by the ongoing anti-Semitism crisis. It does seem clear that while the 
scope and depth of the problem (as well as the way in which is defined and measured) is a matter of 
much debate and controversy, this form of racism is finding some oxygen in certain corners of the 
Party and wider movement. And despite the fact that the attacks on Corbyn have been highly personal, 
unforgiving, and relentless and, therefore, his defensiveness and that of his team understandable to a 
degree, we still think there are valid questions being raised about the way in which the Party is 
responding to these accusations. At best, an opportunity has been lost to educate both party members 
and the public at large about the nature and specific workings of this particular strand of racism with 
the publication of a report entitled ‘Antisemitism in Contemporary Britain’ in 2017 by Daniel Staetsky 
of the well-respected Institute for Jewish Policy Research, a potentially constructive starting point for 
dialogue about a range of issues. At worst, various actors within the leadership team have allowed 
diverse factions, including opposing Jewish groups, e.g., the Jewish Movement for Labour and the 
more recently established Jewish Voice for Labour – to bed in and refuse to listen to each other with 
any care or respect. In this febrile context, the import and effect of antisemitism – whether actually 
widespread or not – risks becoming trivialised. 
8 Lewis Goodall’s (2018) journalistic book Left for Dead? is also, in our view, an analysis of 
Corbynism which, while coming from a position opposed to Corbyn’s politics, is nonetheless 
refreshingly detailed and considered in its analysis and critique. 
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